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The  purchaser–provider  split  (PPS)  is  a service  delivery  model  in which  third-party  payers
are  kept  organizationally  separate  from  service  providers.  The  operations  of the  providers
are managed  by  contracts.  One  of  the  main  aims  of PPS  is  to create  competition  between
providers.  Competition  and  other  incentive  structures  built  into  the  contractual  relation-
ship  are  believed  to lead  to improvements  in  service  delivery,  such  as improved  cost
containment,  greater  efﬁciency,  organizational  ﬂexibility,  better quality  and  improved
responsiveness  of  services  to patient  needs.  PPS  was  launched  in Finland  in  the  early  1990s
but  was  not  widely  implemented  until  the  early  2000s.  Compared  to other  countries  with
PPS the  development  and  implementation  of PPS  in  Finland  has  been  unusual.  Firstly,  pur-
chasing  is implemented  at the  level  of  municipalities,  which  means  that  the  size  of  the
Finnish  purchasers  is  extremely  small.  Elsewhere  purchasing  is mostly  implemented  at  the
regional or  national  levels.  Secondly,  PPS  is  also applied  to  primary  health  care and  A&E
services  while  in other  countries  the  services  mainly  include  specialized  health  care  and
residential care  for the  elderly.  Thirdly,  PPS  in  health  and  social  services  is not  regulated  by
any speciﬁc  legislation,  regulative  mechanisms  or guidelines.  Instead  it is regulated  within
the same  framework  as  public  procurement  in  general.
thors. P© 2013 The Au
. Introduction
In this article we describe the development of the so-
alled purchaser–provider split (PPS) in the delivery of
ealth  care and elderly care services in Finland. While single deﬁnition for PPS is difﬁcult to ﬁnd, the con-
ept subsumes certain basic assumptions, the relevance of
hich  varies across the countries that have implemented
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PPS in their service delivery. In PPS public third-party
payers are kept organizationally separate from service
providers and the operations of the providers are managed
by  contracts [1]. The incentives built into the contractual
relationship are believed to lead to improvements such as
cost  containment, greater efﬁciency, organizational ﬂexi-
bility  and improved responsiveness of services to patient
needs  [2].
There  is little consensus on how the purchasing func-
tion should be formulated or organized in order to achieve
these  goals [3]. However, a general assumption is that the
purchaser is able to articulate the needs and wishes of the
population and make plans for service delivery based on
this  knowledge. In addition it is assumed that a separate
Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license.purchaser agency is able to be more explicit about the costs
and  the quality of the services and also to match political
decision-making and service system priorities better with
the  allocation of the resources. PPS also allows competition
r CC BY-NC-SA license.
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between providers, which is often believed to yield beneﬁts
such  as efﬁciency, cost-effectiveness and improved quality
to  name but a few.
The  idea of implementing PPS in Finnish municipalities
was to a large extent adopted from abroad, mainly from
the  UK (particularly England), Sweden and New Zealand.
In  these countries PPS was implemented in the early 1990s
and  was mainly applied to specialized health care services
(excluding A&E services). The purchasing organizations in
these  countries have mainly been regional or national,
although the arrangements have gone through several
reforms since the early 1990s [4]. In England purchasing is
mainly  primary care – based and currently implemented by
Clinical  Commissioning Groups. Compared to PPS in these
countries the Finnish case, however, is somewhat different
in  terms of the purchasing agency, the services purchased
and in terms of the regulative framework applied to the
procurement of health care and social services in Finland.
In  the following we describe the development of PPS in
Finland  and discuss its peculiarities in terms of how PPS
has  been implemented in other countries. The paper con-
tributes  to the already well-established literature exploring
the  PPS applications in different health care systems [3–7].
2.  History of the purchaser–provider split in Finland
The development of PPS in the management of health
and social care services in Finland was launched in the
early  1990s. A factor prompting the application of PPS
models was the 1993 reform in the state subsidy system
for  municipal health care. Before the reform central gov-
ernment transfers for hospitals were allocated directly to
the  public hospitals. The reform, however, channelled the
state  funding for hospitals through the municipalities as
a  part of general non-earmarked block grants, which de
facto  made the municipalities the purchasers of hospital
services. However, the hospitals were and still are owned
by  federations of municipalities and thus the state subsidy
reform introduced a model of internal contracting in the
Finnish  health care system.
Another segment of the Finnish health care system in
which  purchasing was developed in the early 1990s is reha-
bilitation  services funded by the public health insurance.
The Social Insurance Institution (SII) reimburses a propor-
tion  of the cost of prescription drugs in outpatient care, and
of  visits to private physicians, likewise the costs of employ-
ers  for occupational health services. However, a form of
competitive purchasing was developed for rehabilitation
services in which since the 1990s the SII has selected the
providers of the rehabilitation services through competi-
tive  bidding. [8]
Soon  after the split was created in specialized health
care the municipalities responsible for organizing primary
health  care services in Finland also started to express inter-
est  in implementing PPS models for organizing primary
health care services. The 1993 subsidy reform was partly
marketed to the municipalities by underlining the potential
beneﬁts offered by PPS, such as more effective cost con-
tainment. However, as a reaction to the severe economic
recession in the early 1990s the adoption of the new admin-
istrative  model was postponed. Some hospital districtslicy 111 (2013) 221– 225
developed management by contracts arrangements, which
involved  negotiations between purchasers and providers
as  well as fairly weak contract instruments. However,
PPS really got back onto the agenda only in the early
2000s, since when several municipalities have decided to
implement  PPS in the practice of health and social care
management. According to a survey by the National Insti-
tute  for Health and Welfare about one third of the 378
municipalities in 2009 reported that they were developing
some kind of a “purchaser-provider model” for their health
and  social care management [9]. Recent Governments have
also  supported the adoption of PPS in the organisation of
health  care and social services.
At  the level of the municipalities PPS has been
implemented by creating a ﬁctional market within the
administration of the municipality. The idea of this
so-called internal PPS draws to a large extent on the
“management by results” tradition [10], which began to
gain  popularity in Finland in the 1980s. “Management by
results”  is based on the idea that the providers need to have
more  autonomy and distance from the political decision-
making and municipal administration in order to provide
services efﬁciently and in innovative ways. In small munici-
palities  these internal PPS models have been used mainly as
strategies  to manage services organized jointly by a num-
ber  of municipalities. Particularly in larger cities internal
PPS  has meant substantial administrative reforms inside
the  municipal organization as the administration has been
split  into purchaser and provider organizations.
A second emerging version of PPS has been the increas-
ing involvement of the private service providers in the
delivery of publicly funded health care and social services
(i.e.  contracting out). Municipalities have contracted out
parts  of their services to private service providers since
the  early 1980s. At the time contracting out was  mainly
implemented in housing, public transport, waste manage-
ment  and technical maintenance. However, there is also a
tradition  of the municipalities collaborating with the pri-
vate,  mainly non-proﬁt provider organisations in elderly
care  services. Until the 1980s the activities of these non-
proﬁt  providers were funded in the form of block grants
for  supporting benevolent associations. Thus awarding the
grants  did not involve the providers in any exact obligations
regarding volume or service quality. However, as a national
level  decision the EU regulations on competition and public
procurement were also implemented in health and social
services in the early 2000s. This changed the relationship
between the municipalities and private providers towards
one  emphasising competition and contracting rather than
collaboration. The role of the private sector in the deliv-
ery  of public services has likewise increased. According to
some  estimates the proportion of public services provided
by  the private sector is about one fourth of all health care
and  social services. However, the proportions vary locally
as  well as between services. [11]
As the market for private service provision has
expanded, private for-proﬁt providers have also entered
the  market. Recent studies [12–14] on the municipalities
in Finland suggest that health and social care managers as
well  as politicians have several reasons for including pri-
vate  providers in the public service provision. These include
ealth Po
f
e
d
3
m
t
t
8
m
t
c
t
m
a
m
o
a
a
w
m
(
I
D
e
p
w
t
t
m
[
i
o
m
m
k
p
o
t
l
b
i
b
c
G
u
o
n
h
t
p
m
i
m
i
rL.-K. Tynkkynen et al. / H
or instance willingness to boost the local economy, to
nhance competition between providers and willingness to
evelop  the quality and efﬁcacy of public service provision.
.  The size of the purchaser organisation
The so-called internal PPS in the municipalities was  ﬁrst
ainly  applied in the bigger municipalities in Finland. In
he  late 1990s many of the biggest municipalities (e.g.
he  cities of Tampere, Oulu, Turku, Jyväskylä – population
0,000–200,000 inhabitants) started to reorganize their
anagement systems for PPS, mostly starting in other sec-
ors  than social and health care. By 2010 most of the large
ities  had adopted PPS in social and health care, so that
he  functions of purchasing and provision were somehow
anagerially separated. That is, a ﬁctional market was  cre-
ted  in the city administration and the operations were
anaged by contracts between purchaser and provider
rganizations. In this internal model of PPS the services are
lso  purchased from the private sector. However, the public
nd  private providers have not so far been set to compete
ith each other in open tenders.
In 2012 there were 336 municipalities in Finland and the
edian  size of the municipalities in the continental Finland
i.e.  excluding the very small municipalities of the Åland
slands) was 5839 inhabitants (min = 784; max  = 595,384).
ue to the small size of the municipalities successive gov-
rnments have, for the last two decades, implemented a
olicy  to encourage mergers between municipalities as
ell  as to group local services in larger organizations. For
his  purpose, the Government in 2005 launched a project
o  restructure municipalities and services and set the mini-
um  population base for the service organization at 20,000
15].  Encouraged by extra state subsidies, smaller munic-
palities have carried out a number of mergers or decided
n  collaborative unions [16]. Many of these unions and
erged municipalities have tried to solve the manage-
ent problems of the transformation by introducing some
ind  of separation between purchasing and provision. In
ractice  the size of these areas, where services are jointly
rganized range from around 12,000 to 100,000 inhabi-
ants  [16].
The  attempts of recent governments to concentrate
ocal public authority into much larger municipalities have
een  fairly strongly opposed by the majority of munic-
pal  decision-makers and controversies have also arisen
etween and within the parliamentary parties. In some
ases  the municipalities have refused to comply with the
overnment’s plans to increase the population base of the
nits  organizing the services through municipal mergers
r  joint organizations. Rather than collaborating with the
eighbouring municipalities, these small municipalities
ave contracted out their services to a private enterprise
hat consequently has achieved a monopoly in the service
rovision of these municipalities.
The largest city in Finland to implement PPS in the
unicipal administration is Tampere with some 220,000nhabitants, while the smallest municipalities imple-
enting PPS have fewer than 10,000 inhabitants. Thus
n  comparison to most other countries developing PPS
eforms, where the purchasing agencies are national,licy 111 (2013) 221– 225 223
provincial or regional actors, the size of the Finnish pur-
chasers is extremely small.
4.  Contracting out primary care services
Possibly the most notable peculiarity in the Finnish PPS
applications compared to those of other countries relates to
the  services to which PPS is applied. While PPS was initially
implemented in specialized health care and within the
national health insurance system, the municipalities have
also  increasingly implemented PPS at the level of primary
care  and A&E services. These services can, however, be con-
sidered  as strategic services which the municipalities may
not  contract out to the private sector [17,18]. Elsewhere,
as in the NHS England, the services that are mostly con-
tracted out to the private sector are often specialized health
care  and long-term residential services. General practi-
tioner (GP) services may  be provided in many countries
by private practitioners but in most Beveridgean and Bis-
marckian welfare states quite seldom by private for-proﬁt
ﬁrms. [19]
The  involvement of private for-proﬁt providers in the
delivery of publicly funded primary health care services has
developed  incrementally. The ﬁrst step in the process was
taken  when the municipalities started to lease physician
workforce from personnel service companies specialized in
the  delivery of physician workforce to the municipal health
centres.  While these arrangements helped to some extent
the  municipalities, especially, those in the rural areas, to
relieve  the shortage of physicians, they were costly and not
beneﬁcial  because the personnel were constantly changing.
These  shortcomings caused the municipal health and social
care  managers of the municipalities to rethink their service
organization, which led to the second step in the process.
At  the second stage of the PPS, including private
providers took the involvement of the private sector even
further.  Rather than leasing workforce, the municipalities
began to contract out the responsibility for providing a
range  of services to a given population, such as all outpa-
tient  GP services or A&E services. In 2009 there were 37
contracted out primary health care units [20] but the num-
bers  vary from year to year [21]. In addition, there are a
couple  of small municipalities Rääkkylä (c. 2500 inhabi-
tants) and Tohmajärvi (c. 5000 inhabitants), which have
contracted out all their primary health care and social ser-
vices  to a private enterprise. This has been done partly as a
trial  to oppose the national government’s plans to increase
the  size of the municipalities and partly because collab-
oration with the neighbouring municipalities has proven
impossible or unsuccessful.
The  municipalities have also employed PPS as a strategy
to  organize housing services for the elderly, the disabled
and mental health patients. Many municipalities have
adopted a strategy to meet the increased need for these
services by purchasing them from the private sector
instead of establishing new capacity themselves. The sup-
ply  side of these housing services is supported at the state
level  by the Housing Finance and Development Centre of
Finland  (ARA), which operates under the supervision of
the  Ministry of the Environment. The main task of ARA
is  to ﬁnance state-subsidized rental housing production
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and it is claimed that ARA tends to prefer large private
for-proﬁt providers [22].
While  purchasing services from the private sector has
increased, the strategic service planning and strategic
purchasing in the municipalities have remained inefﬁ-
cient  [23]. Particularly, the assessment of the population’s
service needs in the municipalities is underdeveloped.
This contradicts the aims of improving the role of the
political decision-making and making it concentrate on
strategic  leadership on the basis of needs assessment and
strategic  system development, which are often included
among the main goals for adopting PPS. The idea behind
PPS  is often also to create more entrepreneurial attitude
within the provider organizations. Currently, however, the
tenders  called for by the municipalities are often extremely
detailed and the private providers complain that they do
not  allow much latitude for entrepreneurial innovativeness
[12].
5. PPS and public procurement
In  Finland the PPS in health and social services has no
speciﬁc legislation, regulative mechanisms or guidelines.
Instead it is regulated within the same framework as public
procurements in general. This has potentially several con-
sequences, which are not likely to improve service delivery
to  any large extent. The process of competitive bidding,
provided for in the legislation is demanding and time con-
suming.  Indeed, for instance in New Zealand one of the
main  reasons why PPS was abandoned was the high trans-
action  costs resulting in contracting and partly related to
the  fairly legalistic view on purchasing [24]. In Finland the
development has been somewhat similar. For instance, the
number  of litigated public procurement cases taken to the
court  increased substantially in the late 2000s [25]. This
has  complicated the procurement processes and entailed
higher costs for the municipalities. One reason why the
procurements become subjects of litigation is insufﬁcient
know how to draft contracts and put health care and social
services  out to tender in municipalities.
The market for private service provision has to a large
extent developed due to public procurement by the munic-
ipalities. However, it has not developed in the direction the
municipalities would have wanted. While the municipali-
ties aim at diversity in service provision [13] the result of
procurement has often been a local monopoly gained by
a  big private company. On average, the sizes of the pro-
curements have become fairly large, making it difﬁcult for
small  providers to bid for contracts. This concern has also
been  raised at the municipal level and there are already
cases in which new kinds of procurement models have
been  piloted [26]. However, these initiatives are still at the
experimental stage. As long as the procurement practices
remain unchanged the private market is likely to continue
its  development towards an oligopoly.
6. DiscussionWe  have described the main stages of the development
of the PPS in Finland and discussed the unique character
of  the Finnish PPS applications compared to those of otherlicy 111 (2013) 221– 225
countries, applying the PPS in the delivery of the health
care  and social services. The Finnish case is exceptional in
international comparisons as it represents a case in which
the  purchasers are relatively small and purchasing has been
largely  applied to primary health care and A&E services. In
addition,  health and social services in Finland are governed
by  no speciﬁc legislation, regulative mechanisms or guide-
lines  for PPS, but are regulated within the same framework
as  public procurement in general.
As to the Finnish PPS applications there are a number
of national and local level service system reforms which
have already inﬂuenced the development of PPS in Finland
and  are also likely to do so in the future. The present
government has launched a Reform in Local Government
Structures originally intended to reduce the current num-
ber  of municipalities from the present 320 to decidedly
fewer than 100 [27]. Should the reform succeed, it would
be  one of the most profound reforms in the recent his-
tory  of the Finnish municipalities. The government rhetoric
argues  that the main objective of the reform is to create
economically sustainable municipalities able to take the
responsibility for ensuring basic public services including
a  major part of health and social care for their residents.
In addition the government argues that because service
provision methods are becoming more pluralistic due to
different  applications of the PPS, stronger municipalities
are best equipped to manage their provider market.
The actual aims of the reforms could be (and indeed
are) interpreted in two ways at least. On the one hand it
could  be perceived that the drive towards greater involve-
ment  of private providers is continuing and that the aim
is  to promote the municipalities’ opportunities to focus on
commissioning and to enhance the role of the private sec-
tor  in service provision. Another interpretation could be,
however, that the government aims to create municipali-
ties large and economically strong enough to ensure public
provision of the services thereby restricting the emergence
of  private monopolies and fragmentation of the services in
a  market led service system.
While these two  interpretations both focus on the inter-
relationship between the municipalities and the private
sector, a third way  to look at the future is to discuss the
role  of the service users. In Sweden, for instance, trust
in  PPS as a solution to the challenges of the health care
system has diminished and patient choice has taken its
place  on the health care policy agenda [28]. It has been
argued that if patients had more choice and the money
followed the choice so that providers would only obtain
adequate resources if they were able to attract patients,
then the resulting competition would provide incentives
for  providers to improve the services they provide in terms
of  quality, responsiveness and efﬁciency [29]. In Finland,
too,  legislative changes have recently offered service users
more  choice as regards primary health care unit or a hospi-
tal.  In addition, the use of vouchers in order to enhance
customer choice in health care and social services has
been  possible since 2009. We  have suggested earlier that
countries with PPS applications have not yet reached a per-
manent  form of PPS [20]. Rather, it seems that each reform
in  the system – whether a PPS or something else – gen-
erates pressure for subsequent reforms. Increased patient
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oice and further patient choice [29] are the potential next
teps  in this continuum.
The  structural reform of service production currently
nder discussion is set to overturn the structure of Finnish
ealth  care. Finland, however, has always lacked clear
uidelines or instructions for co-operation between the
rivate  and public sectors or its aims. Experts have
evertheless raised problems pertaining to the lack of
uidance at national level [23]. With the exception of the
ompetition legislation, inadequate regulation can poten-
ially  lead to solutions in contracting out in the municipal-
ties on an ad hoc basis without analysing consequences
n terms of the overall service provision of the municipal-
ty. From the point of view of the system as a whole this
s  not necessarily the most sensible way to organize ser-
ices  for those in need of them. When the right to services
s  fulﬁlled in different ways in different localities and socio-
conomic groups the danger exists that inequalities among
he  people needing services will increase.
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